Dionysius and Aquinas

Pico's admiration for Dionysius is not in doubt. He refers to Dionysius as "prince of Christian theologians" and

along with Dionysius as "the glory of our theology." Dionysius plays a major role in each of the texts under

discussion in this paper because Pico's angelology is largely drawn from Dionysius, who was the main architect of

Christian angelology. The profound influence of Dionysius is discussed in detail in the recent studies of Brian

Copenhaver and Crofton Black. Whatever Pico means by "magic and Kabbalah," it is clear that they must make sense in

terms of Pico's grounding in Dionysian mysticism. He introduces Kabbalah in the Oration using terms connected with

Dionysius. Kabblah is a "supersubstantial theology of ineffable deity" and contains an "exact metaphysics of angels."

Later in his Conclusions Pico will highlight the significance of Cabala for his conception of magical operations, but

in the Oration he describes finding in Kabbalah "the same things we read daily in Paul" _____. Pico's principle

interest in Kabbalah seems to be in comparing it to the mystical theology of Dionysius; any magical meanings are

secondary.

The influence of "The Angelic Doctor" Thomas Aquinas on Pico is no less profound, although his admiration for the

medieval scholastic philosopher is more complicated. We know that Pico collected the works of Aquinas, reading him

enthusiastically and extensively. We will see that Pico follows Aquinas' metaphysical innovations and reading of

Dionysius for certain aspects of the angelology of Heptaplus and negative theology of On Being and Unity. But in the

Conclusions Pico feels free to disagree with Aquinas, and uses his criticism of Aquinas as a general example of the

kind of philosophical opinions that are merely "probable" and should not be confused for matters of faith. Pico does

not attack Aquinas because he is anti-scholastic: Pico is attempting to situate himself within the scholastic

tradition using scholastic methods of debate, although he so provocatively disagrees with certain scholastic

doctrines. Unfortunately, since Pico did not have the opportunity to debate his Conclusions, we do not get very much

information about the specific criticisms he makes of Aquinas. However, in his late works, these controversies are

largely forgotten and he follows Aquinas' reading of Dionysius closely.

What discussion of Pico's profound debt to these two Christian theologians have not taken into account is the

profound influence of Dionysius on the metaphysics and angelology of Aquinas. It has long been understood that Aquinas makes frequent reference to Dionysius in his theological writings, and especially in the "Treatise on Angels" of the Summa Theologiae. But recent scholarship on the influence of Dionysius has demonstrated the decisive impact of Dionysius on the metaphysical developments which Aquinas made in constructing his account of God as "Ipsum esse subsistens." Rather than seeing God as "beyond being" in the manner of Dionysius, Aquinas understood God as "being itself," crafting an interpretation of Dionysius to suit this understanding. This modification of the metaphysics of Dionysius will be crucial to Pico's polemic against Platonists who argue that God is beyond being, based on the idea that unity transcends being. Aquinas took the Dionysian notion of God as self-giving Good to craft his notion of God bestowing being as a gift on his creatures. While this move to understanding God as Being has been understood as an Aristotelian one, more careful scholarship on Aquinas has emphasized the importance of Platonism in his thinking. In particular the Platonic notion of participation--which Aristotle rejected--plays a key role for Thomas, as it will for Pico.

We will see that in his Neoplatonic conclusions Pico explores the metaphysics of participation in the Platonists that Aquinas himself was responding to. Wayne Hankey has studied in detail the presence of "Iamblichean and Procline" philosophical principles which reached Aquinas not only through Dionysius, but in the text of Proclus which was made available in Aquinas' lifetime. Aquinas noticed that Dionysius seems to "everywhere follow Aristotle" on the one hand, but agree with Proclus on certain matters on the other. It was Aquinas' study of the Neoplatonists which led to his own understanding of both the Aristotelian and Platonic traditions, and Aquinas did not always side with the Aristotelians. This complex relationship to the opposing philosphical traditions of Platonism and Aristotelianism characterizes Pico as well as Aquinas, and it makes much more sense to understand him in this context rather than seeing his encounter with Neoplatonic metaphysics as a resort to magic.

The Angel Comparison in Pico's Oration

Pico begins his Oration with a few key Biblical references on angels. According to David, man is only a little lower than the angels. This is an especially effective quotation because it sets up the paradox that Pico is exploring in so few words. Man is connected to the angels—having a rational soul he is part of the angelic continuum of spiritual/intellectual substances—although he is at the bottom rung of the hierarchy. The distance between man and angels must be preserved, but man has such an exalted position in the cosmos that he is only “a little lower” and almost seems to threaten the status of the angels. Pico will be concerned consistently with this comparison, explaining in detail the Christian story about what man shares with angels, how he differs from them, and in some of his more controversial moments what advantages man has over angels. Man can choose his own destiny, but angels being messengers of the divine without self-determination cannot.

more on Aquinas

In his discussion of the influence of Proclus on Pico, Crofton Black mentions Aquinas' reading of Liber de Causis, but does not discuss in detail the influence of Aquinas' concept of Platonism on Pico, or what Pico might have made of Thomas' estimation of Proclus.

Pico had access to more Neoplatonic texts than Aquinas did, as well as the texts of Plato, so he is in a position to understand them better. But he follows Aquinas' Christian developments of Platonism, and develops his own notions about Platonism in response to the medieval scholastic reading of Neoplatonism. Farmer said that he contorts Proclus into the "alien" scholastic structures of the 900 Conclusions, but Aquinas scholars understand Proclus as a proto-scholastic and Aquinas didn't find Proclus alien but found him to agree with Dionysius in places. (Boland/Hankey)


Pico doesn't solve the epistemological problems he works on in 900 Conclusion, but continues describing the angelic part of man. He's not imposing a magical view of angels, but contributing a new philosophical approach to the old Christian problem.

metaphysics important for theory of theurgy, but Pico wasn't looking to Neoplatonism for theurgy theory alone.

Pico could be seen as "less theurgic" than Dionysius and even Aquinas since he spends so little time on sacramental theology.

neoplatonic symbol important influence on Dionysius -- dissimilar similarities

O'Rourke shows how Thomas' negotiation with Dionysius led to the scholastic theologian's own metaphysical innovations.

Wayne Hankey emphasizes the importance not only of Aquinas' encounter with Dionysius, but also his reading of Proclus, for his angelology. Hankey maps Thomas' understanding of the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions
How Thomas saw PD as resonant with Aristotle and Proclus in turn, where Thomas sides with Platonists although he's famously Aristotelian, should help us understand what Pico is doing with Platonists and Aristotelians he responds to.

Yates was mistaken about what Hermetic corpus meant to Pico - not magic - similar misunderstanding happens with Neoplatonism

Pico inherits Aquinas' construction of Platonism, looks at same authors that were important for Thomas' own reconciliation of the Platonic and Aristotelian approaches. He's doing a program of study of the Neoplatonists that was already mapped by Aquinas, but he has more available, including Plato, whom he finds to agree more with Aquinas than with Ficino

We shouldn't speak of Pico's encounter with Neoplatonists like Iamblichus and Proclus without understanding that he already encountered "Platonism" in Aquinas and Dionysius

Crofton Black on similarities and differences between Pico and Dionysius. These departures are key for understanding Pico's originality.

John Bussanich has written detailed studies on Neoplatonism as "mystical theology" in Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Proclus.

revised introduction

Pico della Mirandola's texts contain some of the most controversial writings on angels of the Renaissance. Because he compares man to angels, suggest imitation of angels, becoming angels, and going beyond the angelic state to union with divine—in a text that also celebrates the philosophical-theological value “magic and Kabbalah”—Pico has been suspected of angel magic. As a result of these suspicions, his philosophical treatment of angels has not received the serious attention that it deserves. His ideas about angels when examined carefully turn out not to be so radical or magical, but rather deeply grounded in his Christian Neoplatonic commitments. Pico drew his angelology from Dionysius the Areopagite and Thomas Aquinas, whom he referred to as “the glory of our theology.” He was working with problems he inherited from these authorities concerning the relation between angels and humans and angelic knowledge.

Although the controversial “angel magic” interpretation of Pico has come under historical criticism and is not widely held by Pico scholars (footnote on MVD), these magical interpretations have obfuscated the meaning of Pico's writings on angels, which remain largely neglected although they represent a unique, highly original contribution to Renaissance philosophy, however incomplete and controversial. Recent Pico scholarship has argued for the philosophical seriousness, committed Christian piety, and extensive influence of Pico's thought. In this paper I will review Pico's often unusual, but always pious and philosophical investigations into Neoplatonic and Kabbalistic angel lore. I will argue that his encounters with these foreign angelologies did not represent a dabbling in magic, but rather a philosophical project. It was not an attempt to syncretically include strange or radical non-Christian ideas about angels, but rather an apologetic attempt to find confirmation for Christian angel metaphysics in the ancient and exotic angel lore of the Neoplatonists and Kabbalists.

Admittedly, this philosophical approach cannot take into account all of the problems concerning Pico's “magic and kabbalah.” I will consider approaches to interpreting Pico's “magic and kabbalah” as impacting his angelology, but since these approaches do not seem to work, I will proceed to bracket these problems of magic and consider Pico's angelology as non-magical. Some of the mysteries of Pico's magic and Kabbalah, especially in connection with angels, remain unsolved, but we will be in a better position to solve these problems once we have a better grounding in the philosophical motivations behind Pico's involvement with magic, kabbalah, and angelology. And even if attention to Pico's philosophical motivations cannot clear up all the mysteries of his “magic and kabbalah,” it can give a picture of Pico that does more justice to his philosophy than the glib dismissals that he receives in survey treatments written by authors dubious of Pico due to his undeservedly unsavory reputation.

The Magical Interpretation of Pico's Angelology

Frances Yates professed a popular interpretation of Pico della Mirandola as a Hermetic Renaissance Magus in her “Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition.” She thought that Pico's contribution was bringing Kabbalistic magic, which involved, she thought, conjuring good angels to make magic “safe.” Pico was taking magic up to the supercelestial level, and however cautious and pious he may have been with his “magical mysticism,” his “safe conjuring” leads in a “straight line” to the more dangerous and power-motivated angel magics of latter Christian Cabalist occultists such as Reuchlin, Trithemius, Agrippa, and John Dee.

Frances Yates' interpretation was influential in the 20^th century, but also drew many criticisms. Pico scholars no longer understand Pico as having offered a vision of “Man the Magus.” He himself was clear to distinguish his “licit, natural” magic, which is apparently little more than “the practical part of natural philosophy” (although it has theological significance as a theoretical example). Furthermore, Pico was not discussing “magic and kabbalah” in connection with angels, except in so far as he describes Kabbalah as a Dionysian-style mystical theology—an “ineffable theology of supersubstantial divinity” containing an “exact metaphysics of angels.” Metaphysics is far from magic. Implications of angel magic appear to have been read into Pico's texts by his interepreters. Some of these interpreters imagine that Pico must not have been telling the truth about his interest in angel magic, merely hinting at it but expecting his readers to interpret the metaphysics as really being motivated by magic, or having secret magical applications. But this raises the question of why he spent so little time with magic in his texts—even in the Oration and Conclusions which contain all the suspect magical material. Magic had a significant but small place in Pico's constellation of philosophical influences. The main mistake of interpreters who see Pico as a Magus is that they make magic central when it does not seem that this was the case for Pico. Of course he is famous for having brought “magic and kabbalah” to the table for a philosophical debate, but in doing so he did not intend to make magic central or tamper with the Christian faith in a magical way.

The most recent collection of scholarly essays on Pico only devotes a few sentences to the problem of magic in Pico. Dougherty's article in his Pico della Mirandola: New Essays tersely mentions the “controversial” occultist interpretation of Pico as having come under historical criticism. Later in the book Sheila Rabin argues that Pico studied magic as a university topic, but his interest was strictly theoretical and that he did not practice magic. Many Renaissance historians have pointed out that Pico does not discuss magic in his later texts, and removes the term “kabbalah” from his Heptaplus although Jewish hermeneutics continue to play an important role. One was of understanding this change in the content of Pico's works is to assume that Pico “abandoned” magic and kabbalah, or at least seriously reduced the role of magic and kabbalah in his “system.” Another way to look at this is to understand the magic and Kabbalah of his Oration and 900 Conclusions in the way Pico claims he expected them to be intended. Pico thought a discussion of magic and kabbalah would be interesting and potentially be useful in solving problems having to do with his philosophical project of harmonizing Plato and Aristotle, but he did not bring up magic and Kabbalah because he wanted to import radical ideas or magical ideas into Christianity.

One of the biggest misunderstandings of Pico, which has come under criticism in recent scholarship, is the idea that Pico was a “syncretist” working on a project trying to harmonize the truth of all religious traditions, or a “synthesist” trying to “fuse traditions” by combining Christian mysticism and Pagan or Cabalist forms of magic. The many accounts of Pico as a “syncretist” fail to take into account his stated motivations in exploring extra-Christian philosophical ideas, which Pico thinks confirm the truth of Christianity, rather than seeing them as ideas useful on their own terms. When we look at the methods Pico used to understand, translate, and digest Kabbalistic and Neoplatonic ideas (among other traditions) we see that he was only interested in them insofar as they reminded him of his own tradition. Magic he presents in scholastic terms, attempting to articulate his insights into the theological uses of natural philosophy according to the constraints laid out by medieval Christian philosophical authorities like Roger Bacon, Albertus Magnus, and Thomas Aquinas.

Another “occultist” interpretation of Pico is more persuasive than the “angel magic” version. This approach uses the term “theurgy” to describe Pico's mysticism. Theurgy is a term that has different meanings when used by pagan Neoplatonists like Proclus and Iamblichus, Christian theologians like Dionysius, Renaissance magic theorists, and contemporary scholars of Kabbalah. Brian Copenhaver has argued that Pico uses “magic and Cabala” like the Neoplatonists used theurgy, as a preliminary stage in a system of mystical ascent:

“Theology, spirituality and philosophy—all in the broadest sense—are the main topics of Pico's Cabala, which shows (or hints) how God reveals himself in the Sefirot, the divine names and the words of scripture. In the 72 Cabalist theses at the end of the Conclusions, this revelation becomes Christology and Trinitarian theology. From a Cabalist point of view, the Sefirot and the divine names are actors in dramas of theology, cosmology, anthropology and angelology whose major themes are exile, death, atonement and redemption, stories that Pico transposes onto the Christian Trinity, with Jesus Christ, the Messiah, as the saving hero. Accordingly, leading points of spiritual practice in the Conclusions are prayer, prophecy and ascent to mystical union with God, which is also the main topic of the Oration, where Pico makes positive use of magic and theurgy as steps toward the ascent. The Conclusions, which confirm this endorsement of magic, also show in greater detail than the Oration why Pico links magic with Cabala. He sees it as a spiritual technique which, like the higher theurgy of the Neoplatonic philosophers, locates and opens routes to God which ordinarily are unknown to humans. The practice of Cabala starts with theory because these hidden channels of divinity must be disclosed and interpreted before they can be used: spirituality follows hermeneutics.” (Copenhaver _____ )

Copenhaver calls this system Pico's “angelic regimen,” which he explains in terms of the Dionysian mysticism of imitating the “contemplative life of the angels” laid out in Pico's Oration. According to Copenhaver Pico recognizes a similar theurgy in Kabbalah, although he does not explain how this correlation is established. Alongside these positive uses of theurgy to describe Pico's mystical system, Copenhaver also uses a negative sense of theurgy to describe what Pico is avoiding. Since Pico makes clear in his Apology that he does not intend any demonic or conjuring magic, Copenhaver argues that Pico is trying to find a way to do angel magic “without becoming guilty of theurgy” in his magical and Kabbalistic Conclusions.

Copenhaver's approach is attractive because it attempts to explain Pico's “magic and Cabala” as part of his mysticism. But there are problems with Pico's approach. Pico does not use the term “theurgy” himself when discussing the Neoplatonists, and he doesn't seem very much interested in Neoplatonic magic or theurgy. Moshe Idel has argued that he doesn't find the theurgy in Kabbalah. Instead of Neoplatonic magic, Pico is deeply interested in the same Neoplatonic metaphysics that inspired the angelology of Pseudo-Dionysius, as well as the metaphysical innovations of Thomas Aquinas. Rather than studying Pico's Neoplatonic influences as theurgic influences, I will look at this context of Neoplatonic metaphysics, which forms the background to Christian angelology.

Looking at this background will allow us to clear up many of the magical misconceptions surrounding Pico's writings on angels. Pico does not turn to Neoplatonism and Kabbalah as a resort to magic, but in order to develop philosophical approaches to the problems of angelology he inherited from the great Christian Platonists Aquinas and Dionysius.

Does Pico have a “mystical system?” Is the Oration enough to be understood as a mystical manual, or is it merely the humble exhortation to celebrate philosophy that Pico claims he intended? Unfortunately Pico doesn't give us much information about how magic is to be integrated into his “system.” Many scholars have argued that the Oration and its accompanying 900 Conclusions should not be considered as giving a systematic treatment of Pico's own opinions. Some emphasize that Oration was merely a rhetorical introduction (the name “Dignity of Man” was added after Pico's death), which was never even delivered. But most importantly Pico attempts to make clear what he means by magic, and he is even more clear in his Apology to rule out interpretations such as angel magic, which he explicitly says is not what he's talking about.

Scholarly visions of Pico as magician tend to exaggerate the importance of the Oration in Pico's body of work. Others have pointed out that in Pico's other texts, the position of man is not being celebrated so optimistically. Everywhere else Pico emphasizes the distance between man and angels, the low position of man in the hierarchy and the need for divine assistance. Rather than seeing this as a shift from a “more magical” position in the Oration to a “less magical” position in his later texts, it makes more sense to see Pico's Oration as a somewhat bold rhetorical exercise in celebration of mystical philosophy, but not a manual of angel magic. Although he does not discuss magic in these later texts, Pico's interest in angelology remains consistent. We see Pico developing his account of the “angel comparison,” the notion of becoming angels, the problem of angelic knowledge, and the importance of angelic influence in his later texts. There is still a place for “magic and Kabbalah” as Pico understands them, and we still have much to learn about the ways that Pico understood “magic and Kabbalah” in philosophical and theological terms, but until we better understand Pico's philosophy we must bracket the problem of magic. Pico's encounter with the Neoplatonic metaphysics behind Christian angelology has been neglected in the scholarly study of Pico's texts, but once this important context is better understood we will be on a much more solid foundation to speculate about the mysterious meanings of his magic.

Turning from speculation about Pico's potential “angel magic” or theurgy, I will turn to the philosophical context of Pico's writings on angels. When we look at his angelology (if Pico even has an angelology—his writings are not systematic and characterized by their incompleteness and provisional/experimental nature) in this philosophical context, we see him consistently developing the same themes of the Oration in a non-magical way. For example, when we understand what Pico means by “becoming angelic” in Commento and Heptaplus, texts that contain no magic and very little Kabbalah, it becomes clear that this notion does not depend on magic. While Pico is notorious for bringing “Magic and Kabbalah” to Christianity, ironically his most interesting and original contributions to angelology have little to do with magic.

Wayne Hankey - Iamblichean/Dionysian principles changed in Aquinas' ontology

Equally, Denys, and the Neoplatonism which derives from Iamblichus, are responsible for the principles governing celestial hierarchy in Aquinas, for the enormous role it plays in his system, for the distinctions of its forms and ranks and for their names. However, a great part of the purpose of this hierarchy for Denys is lost when it is moved into Thomas’ world. What intervenes is Thomistic ontology. He insists rigorously on a distinction between the donation of substantial being, which is the creative act, and all other subsequent donations. The higher angels confer knowledge but not, as in Denys, being, grace, and glory on the lower spirits. Moreover, the equality of humans as compared to angels prevents hierarchical communication in the celestial order being the model for that communication in the church. This modeling is fundamental to Denys’ purpose.
"Dionysian Hierarchy in St. Thomas Aquinas: Tradition and Transformation,"

The compromise does not bring out, indeed, it conceals, the principle which determines the matter for Denys and which will determine it again for Aquinas; i.e. hierarchical action is always mediated. The highest of one order never touches a lower order. There must be a diminution of spiritual virtue to a lower level within a hierarchical rank before a higher order of being can come into contact with a lower. Even then the higher touches only the top grade of the lower order. This characteristically Iamblichan and Procline principle, well known to Aquinas, and accepted by him
...Thomas’ identification of the Iamblichan law of hierarchical mediation with the law of grace
"Aquinas, Pseudo-Denys, Proclus and Isaiah VI.6,"

A consequence of Thomas’ submission to the authority of Denys is that he is essential to constructing Latin intellectual and political systems. Doubtless, Denys is transmuted in the systems of intellectual and institutional power he enables. But ironically, this is precisely because the logic he conveys is more inclusively dialectical than those Aristotle or Augustine provided Aquinas. Though he represents the Greek theological tradition, but carries from it a logic of such synthetic power, because of its embedded Iamblichan - Procline Neoplatonism, Denys has been essential to making Latin Christendom the most potent tradition. Whether that power is only the power for the greatest of self-overcomings or has another fate is also profoundly a question of what the Dionysian corpus really is about. Above all it is a question of the difference between what Denys said and what Aquinas heard, together with the questions as to whether we are either more profound, or more accurate, listeners than Thomas was. The trouble is that we shall be able to answer none of these pressing and difficult questions about the discontinuities, if we do not recognize the continuities.
"Denys and Aquinas: Antimodern Cold and Postmodern Hot,"

Thomas’ hermeneutical horizon was profoundly, extensively and subtly Platonist.
...
Thomas wrote a commentary on his De Divinis Nominibus which is our most important source for his knowledge and judgment of Platonism until the works which follow his reading of Proclus’ Elements of Theology. But, as we shall see below, the pervasive Platonism of the Dionysian corpus was hidden to Aquinas for some time. Because of purposes which remain unknown to us, Dionysius not only hid his identity but also obscured his relation to Platonism. In consequence, Thomas had little control over how the Neoplatonism Dionysius authoritatively conveyed affected him.
...
in the passage from the very late De Substantiis Separatis quoted just above, the doctrine that God is the solitary cause of being for all things is stated in a form which sounds more Platonic than Aristotelian. Thomas speaks there of the First Principle as simplicissimum and argues that “because subsistent being (esse subsistens) must be one ... it is necessary that all other things which are under it exist in the way they do as participants in esse (omnia alia quae sub ipso sunt sic esse quasi esse participantia).”[46] His Exposition of the Liber de causis shows that, having looked at Plato more and more in Neoplatonic terms, Thomas saw that for Platonists all is derived from one exalted First Principle. Even if the Platonists “posited many gods ordered under one” rather than as we do “positing one only having all things in itself”, everyone agrees “universality of causality belongs to God” (universalitas .. causalitatas propia est Deo).
...
Thomas’ assessment of Platonism takes place from within it.
...
Plotinus, Simplicius, Proclus, the Arabic Neoplatonic Aristotelians are not Aquinas’ only sources for this idea crucial to reconciling Plato and Aristotle. Thomas also finds it in the Pseudo-Dionysius. [same sources for Pico's reconciliation of Plato and Aristotle]
...
Thomas’ criticism of Plato, a criticism as much Neoplatonic as it is Aristotelian.
...
Thomas’ view of Aristotelianism had been shaped within the tradition of Neoplatonic commentary, aspects of which his own work continued, and partly as a result of the traditional ascription of the Liber to Aristotle. This, at least to a degree, accounts for his thinking that “Dionysius nearly everywhere follows Aristotle”. After reading the Elements of Theology and comparing it with the Liber and the writings of Dionysius, some of his earlier judgments about the Aristotelianism of the two monotheistic authors were confirmed.
Making this comparison, Thomas found that the doctrine of the De Divinis Nominibus was a monotheistically modified Platonism like that of the Liber de causis. The author of the Liber reduces the plurality of the divine hypostases. With the consequent elevation of the First, its creativity as absolute source is correspondingly secured and exalted. Looking at the doctrine of Proclus, his view is confirmed that even the Platonists teach that the First is the cause of the substance of what follows it. Nonetheless, he judges that the doctrine of creation is more securely taught by Aristotle because of his refusal to posit universals existing per se. In the exposition of the Liber, Aquinas associates its author and Dionysius with Aristotle in a criticism of features of pagan Platonism. He uses Dionysius to correct them all.
“Aquinas and the Platonists,”

Aquinas compares Proclus with Dionysius (in Hankey on Isaiah)

Proposition 10 of the Liber de causis proposes that “all intelligence is full of forms”. The causally higher intellects contain more universal forms, from these derive those intelligences which contain less universal forms.[106] Explaining it, Aquinas first notes his agreement with Proclus that the “superiores habent formas magis universales, inferiores vero minus universales” and then tells us that Denys says the same in the Celestial Hierarchy: ubi dicit quod cherubim ordo participat sapientia et cognitione altiori, sed inferiores substantiae participant sapientia et scientia particulariori.[107] Aquinas proceeds to set out his general doctrine on the role of the angelic illuminations in bringing the divine knowledge and purposes to us.

By the point at which he is explaining proposition 19, Thomas can draw together what we have found in propositions 5 and 10 and bring before us a corollary of the lex divinitatis. Proposition 19 distinguishes between, and connects in a descending causal chain, “intelligentia divina”, receiving the first good gifts from the first cause, “intelligentia tantum”, which has between it and the first cause a mediating intelligence, “anima intelligibilis”, and “anima tantum”, from which we arrive at “corpora naturalia tantum”. Thomas’ explanation refers us to proposition 106 of the Elements (on intermediates between what is wholly eternal and what is in time) and then to the De Divinis Nominibus of Denys. There he finds the law that “fines primorum coniunguntur principiis secundorum”. He compares the “divinae intelligentiae” of the Liber de causis to the Dionysian “supremi angeli sunt quasi in vestibulis deitatis collocati”. The seraphim are the very highest of these. In making the categories of Proclus, of the Liber de causis, and of Denys cohere, he shrewdly places in the rank of mere intellects those angels who intermediate between the highest and ensouled humans: Inferiores vero intellectus qui non pertingunt ad tam excellentem participationem divinae similitudinis sunt intellectus tantum, non habentes illam divinam dignitatem.

Pico's "biblical humanism"

Biblical Humanism and Scholasticism in the Age of Erasmus
34 even before the fiasco of his failed Roman disputation... Pico seems to have already turned to working directly on the text of the Bible
35 commentary on Job, eight Psalms
serious engagement with Jewish commentatorys on the Psalms.
Heptaplus was an esoteric decoding of Genesis using an allegorical key inspired by Proclus, Pseudo-Dionysius, the Cabala, and other Jewish sources
according to Crofton Black, obsolete before it was written